

לעילוי נשמת
מרת עקא עדנה
צפורה ע"ה
בת משה מנחם הלוי ז"ל



עניני ארץ

ALIEI DESHE

Weekly Torah Insights and inspiration on the Parsha from the Rosh Yeshiva Shlit"za of Gur

Power of Yaakov

וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹקִים לְיִשְׂרָאֵל בְּמַרְאֵת הַלַּיְלָה וַיֹּאמֶר
יַעֲקֹב יַעֲקֹב

G-d spoke to Yisrael in night visions, and He said, "Yaakov, Yaakov." (Bereishis 46:2)

The Gemara (Berachos 13a) says that one who calls Avraham by the name Avram transgresses a positive and a

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negative mitzvah: וְהָיָה שְׁמֶךָ אַבְרָהָם – *your name shall be Avraham* and וְלֹא יִקְרָא עוֹד אֶת שְׁמֶךָ אַבְרָם – *your name shall no longer be called Avram* (17:5). The Gemara challenges this: If so, the same should be true of anyone who calls Yaakov by the name Yaakov,

since the pasuk says (35:10), וַיֹּאמֶר לוֹ – *G-d said to him, "Your name is Yaakov. Your name shall not be called Yaakov, but Yisrael shall be your name."* The Gemara answers that Yaakov is different, since the pasuk subsequently refers to him as such: וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹקִים לְיִשְׂרָאֵל בְּמַרְאֵת הַלַּיְלָה: וַיֹּאמֶר יַעֲקֹב יַעֲקֹב.

Ohr Hachaim asks: Why don't we extrapolate from the case of Yaakov to that of Avram? Just as Hashem said, "Your name shall not be called Yaakov," yet nevertheless He later called him Yaakov; so too one may call Avraham 'Avram' even though Hashem said "Your name shall no longer be called Avram." *Ohr Hachaim* answers that besides our pasuk which refers to Yaakov again by that name, in the very pasuk where Hashem names him Yisrael, Hashem begins, "Your name is Yaakov." This statement doesn't seem to be necessary to the narrative; clearly, it is to teach us to derive from our pasuk that Yaakov is to remain a permanent name.

Revealing the Hidden

וְהָיָה בְּתִבּוּאוֹת וּנְתַתֶּם חֲמִישִׁית לְפָרְעֹה וְאַרְבַּע
הַיְדִית יִהְיֶה לָכֶם

At the ingathering of the harvests, you will give a fifth to Pharaoh; the [other] four parts shall be yours. (Bereishis 47:24)

In *Kedushas Levi*,⁹ the Berditchever applies this pasuk to the *avodas Hashem* of a Yid. The Gemara (Berachos 10a) explains that David Hamelech said בְּרַכֵּי נַפְשִׁי – *Praise, my soul*, five times, corresponding to five attributes of Hakadosh Baruch Hu and of a person's *neshamah*. Just as Hashem fills the world, so the *neshamah* fills the body; just as Hashem sees but is not seen, so too does the *neshamah*; just as Hashem sustains the entire world, so the *neshamah* sustains the entire body; just as Hashem is *tahor*, so is the *neshamah*; just as Hashem is concealed, so is the *neshamah*. The Gemara concludes, "Let one who has these five characteristics praise One Who has these five characteristics."

Why must Hashem be praised by one who shares His characteristics? *Noam Elimelech*¹⁰ writes that if a person does not understand himself – if he sees himself as merely a machine running the way it was programmed – he can have no understanding at all of Hashem. The Gemara is teaching us that for a person to

9 S.v. *U'b'ofen acher*

10 Va'eschanan, s.v. *Hishamer*

Power of Yaakov

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The context of our pasuk – where the name Yaakov is given permanence – is Yaakov's *nevuah* that he will go down to Mitzrayim. אַל תִּירָא מִרְדֵּה מִצְרַיִם רִימָה כִּי לְגוֹי גָדוֹל אֲשִׁימָךְ שָׁם, אֲנֹכִי אֲרַד עִמָּךְ מִצְרַיִם וְאֲנֹכִי אֶעֱלֶה גַם עִלָּהּ – *Have no fear of descending to Mitzrayim, for I shall establish you as a great nation there. I shall descend with you to Mitzrayim, and I shall also surely bring you up* (46:3-4). Why specifically here was Yaakov informed that that name would remain?

The name Yaakov is representative of his ongoing battle with Esav: וַיֵּדוּ וַיִּשְׂאוּ אַחֲזָת בְּעֵקֶב עֵשָׂו – *and his hand was grasping onto the heel of Esav*. Although Yaakov won his struggle with Esav's *malach*,¹ the war was not over; the clashes would continue throughout our long history of exiles. Thus, before Yaakov embarked on this first exile, to *Mitzrayim*, Hashem gave permanence to the name Yaakov, so that he could actualize his potential of וַיֵּדוּ וַיִּשְׂאוּ אַחֲזָת בְּעֵקֶב עֵשָׂו.

But why did Hashem repeat Yaakov's name twice: וַיִּאֶמֶר יַעֲקֹב יַעֲקֹב? After Yosef revealed himself to his brothers in Mitzrayim, he introduced five of them to Pharaoh.² Rashi cites Chazal³ that he presented the weakest of his brothers – Zevulun, Gad, Dan,

Naftali and Asher. The names of these *shevatim* were also repeated twice when Moshe blessed them, in order to give them added strength.⁴ We may suggest that likewise, Hashem repeated Yaakov's name twice before his first *galus* would begin, in order to fortify him for his struggle with the nations.

At this juncture Hashem told Yaakov, אֲנֹכִי אֲרַד עִמָּךְ מִצְרַיִם וְאֲנֹכִי אֶעֱלֶה גַם עִלָּהּ. The Berditchever interprets אֲנֹכִי ה' אֶלְקֵיךָ as a reference to אֶלְקֵיךָ (Shemos 20:2), the opening phrase of the *Aseres Hadibros*. The message was: The purpose of your descent to Mitzrayim is your coming redemption and *kabbalas haTorah*. To achieve this, Bnei Yisrael would need to preserve their lifestyle: to retain their characteristic speech, dress, and names, and to guard against the depravity of Egyptian culture. All this, so that they could continue the struggle against Esav and ultimately accept the Torah.

וַעֲתָה לֹא אִתָּם שְׁלַחְתָּם אֵתִי הֲנֵה כִּי וְעַתָּה לֹא אִתָּם שְׁלַחְתָּם אֵתִי הֲנֵה כִּי – *And now: It was not you who sent me here, but G-d* (45:8). The Slonimer Rebbe explained⁵ that this is a declaration we all must make: *It was not you, the physical and mundane distractions I face, that sent me down to this world; I was not sent here to engross*

myself in such matters. I was sent here by Hashem, for Hashem; to reveal His Presence in this world. This is what we must remember as we battle our way through *galus*.

The Midrash⁶ relates that Hashem told Avraham את הדרך לפני בניך, *Go prepare the way for your children*. Whatever Avraham experienced would be experienced by his descendants. It feels like just yesterday that I heard the Beis Yisrael's remark on this;⁷ his words still ring in my ears: צא וכבוש את הדרך, איזהו גבור הכובש את יצרו – *In what way would the Avos prepare the way for their children? By conquering their yetzer hara, so that their children could do the same!*⁸

The struggle with Esav's evil ways is difficult and ongoing, and will only conclude with the fulfillment of וַעֲלוּ מוֹשְׁעִים בְּהַר צִיּוֹן לְשַׁפֵּט אֶת הָרָע עֵשָׂו – *And saviors will ascend Mount Tzion to judge the Mountain of Esav* (Ovadyah 1:21). In the meantime, every Yid has within him the power to withstand any *nisayon* he faces throughout the *galus*: the power of “Yaakov, Yaakov.”

(ויגש תשפ"ג – ס"ג מאמר א)

1 כי שרית עם אלקים ועם אנשים ותוכל - *For you have striven with the Divine and with man and have overcome* (32:29).

2 ומקצה אחיו לקח חמשה אנשים ויצגם לפני פרעה - *Of his brothers he took five men and presented them to Pharaoh* (47:2).

3 Bava Kamma 92a

4 See Rashi, Devarim 33:18; Maharsha, Bava Kamma ibid, in his second explanation.

5 See *Divrei Shmuel*

6 Bereishis Rabbah 40:6

7 See *Beis Yisrael*, Vayishlach 5737 and other locations

8 For the same reason, as Yaakov got ready to descend to Mitzrayim, he sent Yehudah ahead to prepare, as the pasuk says (46:28) וַאֲתָ יְהוּדָה שְׁלַח לְקִנְיָו - *He sent Yehudah ahead of him*.

Guaranteed Marriage

כִּי עֲבֹדָה עָרַב אֶת הַנֶּעָר

For your servant guaranteed the youth.
(Bereishis 44:32)

The Gemara (Kiddushin 6b) states that a woman can accept *kiddushin* in a manner similar to a guarantor (*arev*). Just as a guarantor can become responsible without receiving any benefit by the transaction, a woman can become married by instructing a man to pay a third party.

How, in fact, is this *kiddushin* effectuated? The Yerushalmi explains that when money is given to the party the woman specifies, one of two things is seen as happening: either that party accepts the money on behalf of the woman (so that she actually does receive the money) and then takes it back for himself; or the giver (the future husband) acquires the money on her behalf and then gives it to the party she requested.

However, the *mefarshim* explain our Gemara differently. R. Akiva Eiger¹⁷ cites the Rashba and Rambam who understand that when the recipient benefits from the money, the woman herself is seen as benefiting from it. R. Akiva Eiger takes another approach. The man's expending funds on the woman's instruction is considered a monetary endowment to her, as if he had given the money to her.

R. Akiva Eiger's approach, that the man's disbursal of money on her request is seen as if it were given to her, sounds similar to the Yerushalmi's understanding, that the woman did in fact receive the money. In truth, however, these approaches are not the same. According to the Yerushalmi, the woman actually received the money in question, which then left her ownership for the third party. According to R. Akiva Eiger, it is *as if* she received it; she gained *hana'ah* (benefit) from it as if it were given to her.¹⁸

This distinction has a halachic ramification. Many *Acharonim* write that one cannot perform *pidyon haben* by providing a *kohen* with *hana'ah* worth five *sela'im*; the payment must be with a moveable, valuable item, if not actual money. Following R. Akiva Eiger's approach, if a *kohen*

would tell the father of a firstborn son, "Give five *sela'im* to so-and-so, by which your son will be redeemed," the *pidyon* would not be valid. The *kohen* did not receive the money; he only benefited from it. According to the Yerushalmi, however, the *pidyon* would be valid, since the money entered the *kohen's* possession before going to the third party.

As above, in the case of *kiddushin* learned from *arvus* the Rashba explains that when the third party benefits from the money, the woman is seen as benefiting from it as well. The Rashba also writes that when the man gives the money to the recipient, he must tell the woman, "Accept *kiddushin* from me with this *hana'ah*." R. Akiva Eiger asks: Why doesn't the Rashba explain the workings of the *kiddushin* as R. Akiva Eiger does, according to which the woman is seen as accepting the actual money? For if this is what the Gemara means, the man wouldn't need to reclassify the *kiddushin* as occurring with *hana'ah*, since it occurs with the money the woman is seen as receiving.

This question is difficult to understand. It is likely that even had the Rashba understood the Gemara like R. Akiva Eiger, still, he would have required the man to classify the *kiddushin* as occurring with *hana'ah*. As we have seen, even following R. Akiva Eiger's reasoning, the woman has not received the actual money, but it is *as if* she has, in that she gained full *hana'ah* from it.¹⁹

In a separate *teshuvah*,²⁰ R. Akiva Eiger quotes a question posed by his son, R. Shlomo Eiger. If a woman made a *neder* to prohibit herself from gaining any benefit from a specific loaf of bread, and then she told a man, "Give this loaf to so-and-so, by which I will be married to you" – is the *kiddushin* valid? The *teshuvah* does not elucidate the reasons it would or would not be valid.

To start with, according to the Yerushalmi's understanding of *kiddushin* learned from *arvus*, the *kiddushin* would certainly not be valid. *Kiddushin* cannot be performed with *issurei hana'ah* (objects prohibited for benefit). According to

the Yerushalmi, the woman actually receives the money (or object), and since she is prohibited from benefiting from it, she would not become married.

The question is relevant, however, according to R. Akiva Eiger's own understanding of *kiddushin* learned from *arvus*. After all, the woman is not receiving the actual loaf whose *hana'ah* is prohibited to her, so perhaps the *kiddushin* would be valid.

The question hinges on the following: In R. Akiva Eiger's approach, when the man follows the woman's directive and gives the loaf to the party she has named, does the woman benefit from the loaf itself, or only from the man's act of giving it? If her *hana'ah* is from the loaf, she would not be married, since it is *assurb' hana'ah* to her. If, however, she derives *hana'ah* only from the man's giving, the *kiddushin* would be valid.²¹ To me, this second line of reasoning seems more correct.

The Rambam²² rules that (as above) one cannot perform *kiddushin* with items of *issurei hana'ah*. This is true even if they are prohibited only to this woman. *Ohr Same'ach* asks: Granted, a woman cannot be married through the actual object of *issurei hana'ah*, but why isn't the fact that the man expended his resources on her request itself enough for *kiddushin*? At first glance, this would seem to depend on the above: does the *hana'ah* come from the actual object, or from the man's payout?

However, it is not so. Even if we suppose that in R. Shlomo Eiger's scenario the *kiddushin* is valid, that is because the woman specified that she would be married by such a *hana'ah* – not by the loaf itself. In *Ohr Same'ach's* case, however, the woman intends to be married by receiving the actual item of *issurei hana'ah*. She cannot be married by this item because it is prohibited to her, and she is also not married by the *hana'ah* of the man's outlay, since she did not have this *hana'ah* in mind.

(בנאות דשא – ויגש תשכ"ג)

17 *She'elos U'Teshuvos*, vol. 8, E.H. 67

18 This seems to be the proper understanding of R. Akiva Eiger's approach.

19 According to the Yerushalmi, however, the woman *did* receive the actual money, so the *kiddushin* would not be classified as being enacted by *hana'ah*.

20 Printed in *She'elos U'Teshuvos R. Shlomo Eiger*, vol. 2, *Kesavim*, 36

21 After all, the man is permitted to benefit from the loaf.

22 *Hilchos Ishus* 5:1