

לעילוי נשמת
מרת עקא עדנה
צפורה ע"ה
בת משה מנחם הלוי ז"ל



עַלֵּי דֵשֶׁה

AL EI DESHE

Weekly Torah Insights and inspiration on the Parsha from the Rosh Yeshiva Shlit"a of Gur

Holy Fire

פִּינְחָס בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן אַהֲרֹן הִכְהֵן הַשִּׁיב אֶת חֲמָתִי
מֵעַל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּקִנְאוֹ אֶת קִנְאַתִּי בְּתוֹכָם

Pinchas, son of Elazar, son of Aharon the Kohen turned back My wrath from upon Bnei Yisrael, when he zealously avenged My vengeance among them.
(Bamidbar 25:11)

What does the pasuk mean with the word בְּתוֹכָם? In what sense was Pinchas's

perpetrated in the midst of Bnei Yisrael had been committed by himself. How do we understand this?

It is well-known that when the Rebbe R. Zusha would encounter someone so entrenched in sin that he was completely oblivious to it, he would begin to confess out loud: "Zusha! How could you do such *aveiros*?" Hearing this, the sinner would be moved to do *teshuvah* of his own. But how could R. Zusha confess to doing things he hadn't done?² The answer is that since all Jews are responsible for one another, when any Jew sinned, R. Zusha felt he was partly to blame. כל ישראל ערבים זה לזה (Shavuos 39a) is not just about allowing one to be *motzi* another with a *berachah*; it means that Klal Yisrael is one indivisible body.³ When someone else would transgress an *aveirah*, R. Zusha would say *vidui* on his part of the Yid's *aveirah*.

It was this feeling that led Pinchas to take action. Pinchas's zealousness expressed his deep understanding that

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The tools and conveniences of this world should only be used in cases of absolute necessity; beyond that, they should be looked upon with disgust

act of *kana'us* 'among Bnei Yisrael'? The Sfas Emes explains¹ that it was because Pinchas felt himself 'among' Klal Yisrael that he was jolted into action; Pinchas felt as though the sin that was

1 ד"ה השיב (השלישי), *Likutim*.

2 It is certainly permissible to bend the truth in order to inspire someone to *teshuvah*, creating peace between man and Hashem, just as one can do so to create peace between two people (Yevamos 65b). Nonetheless, there was certainly a deeper intent in the case of R. Zusha's *vidui*.

3 See *Sha'ar Hakavanos* of the Arizal, end of דרושי חזרת העמידה; *Pnei Menachem*, Pinchas p. 165; *Otzar Dera-shos*, vol. 1 p. 150 (note the wording)

Day In and Day Out

אֶת הַכֶּבֶשׂ אֶחָד תַּעֲשֶׂה בַבֹּקֶר וְאֶת הַכֶּבֶשׂ הַשֵּׁנִי
תַּעֲשֶׂה בֵּין הָעֶרְבִים

The one lamb shall you make in the morning and the second lamb you shall make in the afternoon. (Bamidbar 28:4)

The Maharal⁸ cites a Midrash⁹ in which several *Chachamim* debate which pasuk best encompasses all of Torah: According to Ben Zoma it is שְׁמַע יִשְׂרָאֵל ה' אֶלְקֵינוּ ה' אֶחָד – *Hear, Yisrael, Hashem is our G-d, Hashem is the One and Only* (Devarim 6:4); according to Ben Nannes it is וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֶךָ כְּמוֹךָ – *you shall love your fellow as yourself* (Vayikra 19:18); according to Shimon ben Pazi it is אֶת הַכֶּבֶשׂ אֶחָד תַּעֲשֶׂה בַבֹּקֶר וְאֶת הַכֶּבֶשׂ הַשֵּׁנִי תַּעֲשֶׂה בֵּין הָעֶרְבִים. The Midrash concludes that R. Ploni stood up and declared that the halachah follows Shimon ben Pazi.

The Maharal delves into this Midrash. It is easy to see how שְׁמַע יִשְׂרָאֵל encompasses all of Torah; all the mitzvos are simply the manner in which to reach the *deveikus* of *Shema Yisrael*. וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֶךָ, too, is considered a great rule of the Torah. But what is special about the mitzvah of *Korban Tamid* more than any of the other mitzvos?

The Maharal explains that it is the constancy of the *Korban Tamid* that encompasses all of Torah. Even *Shema*

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8 *Nesivos Olam, Nesiv Ahavas Rei'a*, chapter 1

9 Quoted in *Ein Yaakov, Hakdamas Hakosev*

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he, as a part of Klal Yisrael, must rectify the sin that had been transgressed. He must do away with evil, and reveal the true holiness that lies inside every Jew, by drawing him close to Hashem and leading him to *teshuvah*.

Such feelings of responsibility for another's sins is a high *madreigah*, befitting great *tzaddikim* who are free of sins of their own. But let us explore another interpretation of בְּתוֹכָם offered by the Sfas Emes, which is relevant to all of us.

The Sfas Emes explains⁴ that through his *kana'us*, Pinchas ignited a fire, an *esh kodesh*, in the heart of every Jew, which would burn with zealousness for Hashem's honor. This fire was not just about sticking sinners with spears; it was first and foremost about confronting the evil within oneself. Pinchas took action *among Bnei Yisrael* in that from here on, every Jew could sustain a deep hatred toward the wickedness that lies inside him.

This idea was already expressed by the Chiddushei HaRim.⁵ The pasuk (Tehillim 4:5) states, וְגִזְזוּ וְאֵל תִּתְּאוּ – *Tremble and do not sin*. The Gemara (Berachos 5a) expounds, “One should always provoke (ירגיז) his *yetzer tov* against his *yetzer hara*.” It was Pinchas who gave Klal Yisrael the gift of this ability, so that now, when a Yid has an improper thought or considers taking a wrongful action, he can turn to himself in anger and shout, “How can you have such *chutzpah* toward Hashem?”

The Sfas Emes adds to this: the pasuk says of Pinchas, הָשִׁיב אֶת חֲמָתִי – *he turned back My wrath*. In Malachi (2:6), the pasuk says of him, in similar words: וְרַב־בָּיִם הָשִׁיב מֵעוֹן – *he turned many away from sin*. Through his act of *kana'us*, Pinchas inspired *kana'us* against evil in all members of Bnei Yisrael, leading them to *teshuvah*.⁶

* * *

The pasuk (Michah 6:5) states, עַמִּי זָכַר נָא, מִהַ יַעֲזֹב בְּלֶקֶת מְלֶכֶּה מוֹאָב, וּמִהַ עָנָה אֹתוֹ בְּלַעַם בֶּן בְּעוֹר, מִן הַשְּׂטִיִּים עַד הַגִּלְגָּל, לְמַעַן דַּעַת צְדָקוֹת ה' – *My people, hear now what Balak king of Moav schemed, and what Bilaam son of Beor answered him, [and all the events] from Shittim to Gilgal – in order to recognize the righteous acts of Hashem*. What does לְמַעַן דַּעַת צְדָקוֹת ה' refer to? Shittim was the site of the sin of *Baal Peor*, and was where Pinchas took zealous action. But what was the significance of Gilgal? Simply, since Gilgal was Klal Yisrael's point of entry into Eretz Yisrael, the *navi's* intent is that we must thank Hashem for bringing us into Eretz Yisrael. Let us explore a deeper meaning.

When Bnei Yisrael entered Eretz Yisrael, they were commanded to wipe out its inhabitants. This wasn't an appealing thought; in their eyes, their new neighbors would be better put to work as woodchoppers and water-drawers. When Bnei Yisrael did not fulfill Hashem's command, they were rebuked by a *navi*, as the pasuk (Shoftim 2:1) says, וַיַּעַל מְלֶאכֶּה ה' מִן הַגִּלְגָּל אֶל הַבְּכִיִּים – *An emissary of Hashem*

went up from Gilgal to Bochim. Chazal explain⁷ that the emissary was Pinchas, who received a *nevuah* in Gilgal that he was to rebuke Bnei Yisrael in Bochim for not heeding Hashem's command.

This, then, is the meaning of מִן הַשְּׂטִיִּים מְעַד הַגִּלְגָּל. The same Pinchas who acted zealously for Hashem's name in Shittim, killing the sinners and arousing a fire of *kana'us* in every Jewish heart against the evil within, arrived as well from Gilgal, to remind Klal Yisrael that they must eradicate the neighboring nations. This message was not specific to that time and place. Pinchas meant it as a lesson for all time: every Yid must work to exterminate the un-Jewish element concealed within him.

It is very difficult to rid oneself of the *yetzer hara* itself, but we must take steps to purge ourselves of un-Jewish activity. Just as Bnei Yisrael wanted to spare the nations so that they could serve them, people often do not want to completely get rid of certain non-Jewish paraphernalia and practices, hoping to make good use of them. But just as Bnei Yisrael were wrong in that instance, the same is true here. The tools and conveniences of this world should only be used in cases of absolute necessity; beyond that, they should be looked upon with disgust. This is our legacy from Pinchas, who ignited within us a fire of *kedushah*, and *turned many away from sin*.

(פינחס תשפ"א, ס"ג מאמר א)

4 5642

5 *Sefer Hazechus*, Pinchas

6 See Maharam Schiff, Gittin 90b end of s.v. *V'hi Chavertecha*

7 See Rashi

Day In and Day Out

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Yisrael and *V'ahavta L'rei'acha Kamocha* are deficient when practiced without consistency; *avodas Hashem* needs to be practiced with absolute steadiness. This is why the pasuk of אֶת הַכֶּבֶשׂ אֶחָד תַּעֲשֶׂה בְּבִקְרָא best represents the whole Torah.

The pasuk refers to the *Korban Tamid* as (28:6) עלת תמיד העֲשֶׂיהָ בְּהָר סִינַי – *the Korban Tamid that was done at Har Sinai*. The word עֲשֶׂיהָ also means 'complete.' When our *avodas Hashem* is complete in the manner of *Korban Tamid* – when it is perfectly consistent – then

Even Shema Yisrael and V'ahavta L'rei'acha Kamocha are deficient when practiced without consistency; *avodas Hashem* needs to be practiced with absolute steadiness

it is בְּהָר סִינַי, it carries the power of *kabbalas haTorah* at Har Sinai.

The Gemara (Shabbos 105b) says: "This is the *yetzer hara's* trade: today he says, 'Do this,' and tomorrow he says, 'Do this,' until ultimately he says, 'Worship *avodah zara*.'"

What is meant by 'this' and 'this'? What is the *yetzer hara's* point of offense; where does he begin his attack? If we could know, we would be better prepared to defend ourselves.

The answer is that the *yetzer hara* does not begin by suggesting that we do *aveiros*. Today he says, 'Do this,' and tomorrow he says, 'Do this' — his advice is that we try one method of *avodas Hashem* today, and then tomorrow dip our feet into another. Without consistency, we are defenseless against the *yetzer hara*. In order to stand strong against

the *yetzer hara*, a person must hold on to the regularity of his *avodas Hashem*, day in and day out, without exception.

The pasuk (28:7) describes the *nesachim* of the *Korban Tamid*: וְנִסְכּוֹ רְבִיעִת הֵהִיךְ לְכֶבֶשׂ הָאֶחָד – *Its libation is a quarter-hin for the one lamb*. The Gemara (Yoma 34a) cites a disagreement if this pasuk refers to the *nesachim* of the morning *Tamid* or of the afternoon *Tamid*. The Rabbanan maintain that it is of the afternoon *Tamid*, and the *nesachim* of the morning *Tamid* are derived from it; Rebbi holds just the opposite. *Tosafos*¹⁰ explains the ramification of this dispute: precedence is given to the *Tamid* whose *nesachim* are directly mandated by the pasuk. Thus, if there is only enough wine for *nesachim* of one *Tamid*, it would be used for that *Tamid*.

The Sfas Emes writes that this does not seem to be the halachah. Even if the pasuk refers to the morning *Tamid* — if it is now afternoon, and the obligation of *nesachim* is upon us, we must fulfill our obligation with whatever wine is available, even at the expense of tomorrow morning's *nesachim*.

Seemingly, in the Sfas Emes's understanding, *Tosafos* means that precedence is given to the *Tamid* discussed by the pasuk even where it overrides *nesachim* of the previous day; meaning, according to Rebbi, tonight's *nesachim* must be forfeited for tomorrow morning's *nesachim*.

But upon close examination of the words of *Tosafos*, it appears that it is discussing a case where the two *nesachim* in question are both of the same day:¹¹ where in the morning there is only enough wine for one *nisuch*, either the present one or that afternoon's *nesachim*. It is then that the one discussed by the pasuk takes precedence.

We must now consider whether both *Temidim* of one day are considered one mitzvah or two. If they are one mitzvah,

then the Sfas Emes's difficulty with *Tosafos* would seem to be resolved; the present part of the mitzvah – the morning *nisuch* – can be given up for the later, and more prominent, part of the mitzvah – the afternoon *nisuch*. But if they are two separate mitzvos, the Sfas Emes's question remains.

Let us now look at *Tosafos's* message from a different angle. The pasuk (Yechezkel 46:13) describes the *Korban Tamid* of the third *Beis Hamikdash*: וְכָבֶשׂ בֶן שָׁנָתוֹ תַמִּים תַּעֲשֶׂה עוֹלָה לַיּוֹם – *You shall prepare a sheep in its first year, unblemished, as a daily Olah for Hashem; you shall make it every morning*. The Radak notes that there is no mention of an afternoon *Tamid*; seemingly, *l'asid lavo* there will only be a morning *Tamid*. Why is this so?

Until the coming of Mashiach, there are mornings, afternoons, and nights: periods of light, of waning light, and of darkness. In the future, there will be only light; there will be no difficulties at all. Thus, there will not be an afternoon *Tamid*.

In the present era, when we encounter times of darkness – of *nisyonos*, hardship or adversity – it is very difficult to serve Hashem properly. But we must remember that the halachah follows the Rabbanan, which means the most important *nisuch* is that of the afternoon *Tamid*, when the light is waning. Hashem desires most our *avodah* of evening, performed amid difficulty. The Gemara (Eiruvim 19a, see Rashi) states that *nesachim* are symbolic of tears. To cry tears of *teshuvah* at a time of *nisayon* – at that time when one's *avodas Hashem* is most valuable – is of primal significance.

This is a fundamental lesson from the *avodah* of the *Korban Tamid*: we are to serve Hashem with consistency and regularity, even at times of darkness and concealment.

(פיניחס תשפ"א, ס"ג מאמרב)

10 34b s.v. Rebbi

11 See *Sfas Emes*, beginning of the tenth chapter of *Zevachim*

Overriding Inheritance

אִישׁ כִּי יָמוּת וְגַבְרָא אֵין לוֹ וְהֶעֱבְרָתֶם אֶת נַחֲלָתוֹ לְבָתוֹ. וְאִם
אֵין לוֹ בֵּת וְנָתַתֶּם אֶת נַחֲלָתוֹ לְאָחָיו.

If a man will die and he has no son, you shall give his inheritance to his daughter. If he has no daughter, you shall give his inheritance to his brothers. (Bamidbar 27:8-9)

The Mishnah (Bava Basra 130a) cites the opinion of R. Yochanan ben Berokah that one may override his inheritors only in favor of others fit to inherit him. The Gemara explains this in two ways: 1. One can give his inheritance (*be manchil*) to one son in place of another son, but not to a daughter in place of a son; 2. One can do so even to a daughter in place of a son, since she is next in line to inherit. The *Rishonim* write that the halachah follows the first approach: a father can be *manchil* one son in place of another, but not a daughter in place of a son, since she is not presently an inheritor.

The *Acharonim*¹² discuss a scenario where one has no sons, but has multiple grandsons: may he be *manchil* one grandson? This question depends on what R. Yochanan means when he allows *hanchalah* to “others fit to inherit him.” Is this only where the intended recipient is *inherently* fit to inherit him, such as one of two sons, or is it even where the recipient is only an inheritor *in practice*, such as a grandson, who inherits indirectly, by way of his father.

The *Ketzos Hachoshen* favors the second understanding: as long as he is practically an inheritor, one can be *manchil* him. But this seems problematic. The *Ketzos Hachoshen* writes elsewhere¹³ that where a person was *manchil* one son in place of others, the other sons remain “fit to inherit”; although they were left out of the inheritance, their inherent status as inheritors cannot be canceled. So which approach is correct according to the

Ketzos Hachoshen? Do we regard the actual, inherent status of an inheritor; or do we regard the person who will, in practice, inherit?

The question of being *manchil* a grandson may depend on another question of how we understand R. Yochanan’s opinion. Simply, he maintains that one cannot regard someone who is not an inheritor as an inheritor. But the Rama¹⁴ explains differently: one cannot be *manchil* a daughter in place of a son because the Torah mandates that his son inherit him; by giving his inheritance to his daughter, he supplants the proper inheritor with another. If so, where one has no sons but only grandsons, he may be *manchil* one grandson, since he is not displacing anyone whom the Torah mandates must inherit.

As mentioned, if indeed R. Yochanan considers anyone who inherits in practice as an inheritor, then one could certainly be *manchil* a grandson in place of other grandsons. *Kovetz Shiurim* proves that this is the case from a statement of the Rashba.

The Gemara (Kiddushin 60b) discusses a case where one divorces his wife on condition that she give him two hundred *zuz*, and then the husband dies. R. Shimon ben Gamliel says that if she gives the money to her husband’s inheritors, such as his brother, father, or other relative (he did not leave children), then she is considered divorced. The Rashba wonders about this: why may she pay her husband’s “other relative”; since his brother is first in line to inherit him, how can she pay a more distant relative? The Rashba answers, citing *Tosafos*, that the case in question is where the husband’s brother had died, leaving a son. It is to this son – the husband’s nephew – that the wife can pay the two hundred *zuz*, since R. Yochanan ben Berokah maintains that one can be *manchil* anyone fit to inherit.

This, says *Kovetz Shiurim*, proves that R. Yochanan allows *hanchalah* to anyone who *in practice* is fit to inherit. After all, the husband’s nephew is not inherently his inheritor; he only inherits in practice, since his father – the husband’s brother and true inheritor – has died.

However, it seems that we can draw the opposite conclusion from this statement of the Rashba. The Rashba’s question is asked, as well, by *Tosafos HaRosh* and *Tosafos Tuch*, who answer in the same manner, but add that this is consistent with the Gemara’s second understanding of R. Yochanan ben Berokah’s opinion. As above, this approach was that R. Yochanan allows *hanchalah* even to a daughter in place of a son, since she is next in line to inherit.

But since the halachah follows the Gemara’s first understanding of R. Yochanan – that *hanchalah* is permitted only to a son in place of other sons – why do *Tosafos HaRosh* and *Tosafos Tuch* explain R. Shimon ben Gamliel’s statement differently? Clearly, they maintain that according to the first understanding of R. Yochanan, the husband’s nephew is not fit for *hanchalah*, since he only inherits in practice but is not inherently an inheritor.

Although the Rashba did not add this addendum – that R. Shimon ben Gamliel’s statement is consistent with the second understanding of R. Yochanan – nonetheless, he attributes his answer to *Tosafos*. It seems clear, then, that he intends the very answer given by *Tosafos HaRosh* and *Tosafos Tuch*. If so, the Rashba’s statement is actually proof that one can only be *manchil* an inherent inheritor, not one who only inherits in practice.

(בגאון דשא – פינחס תשפ”ב)

12 R. Akiva Eiger, beginning of *perek Yesh Nochalin*, ד”ה נלע”ד, *Ketzos Hachoshen*; 281:2; *Nesivos Hamishpat*, 281:1; *Kovetz Shiurim*, 435

13 *Ibid*, 3

14 *She’elos U’Teshuvos*, 92