

בס"ד

למודי משה

בראשית - גליון פ"ד

“When no shrub of the field was yet on earth and no grasses of the field had yet sprouted, because Hashem our G-d had not sent rain upon the earth and there was no man to till the soil” (*Bereishis* 2:5).

ומ"ט לא המטיר לפי שאדם אין לעבד את האדמה ואין מכיר בטובתם של גשמים וכשבא אדם וידע שהם צורך לעולם התפלל עליהם וירדו וצמחו – האילנות והדשאים – “What is the reason that Hashem had not caused it to rain? Because there was no man to till the ground, and there was therefore, no one to recognize the utility of rain. When Adam came (was created), however, and he realised that it was necessary for the world, he davened for it and it fell, so that trees and verdure sprang forth.” (Rashi)

Insights into Halachah

Mashiv horuach on Friday night

The *Shulchan Aruch* (*Orach Chaim* 114:5) *paskens*: – “During the rainy season, if one misses out *morid hagoshem* (*hageshem*), he needs to repeat *shemonah esrei*”.

Chiddush of R' Akiva Eiger

The *Biur Halachah* brings a R' Akiva Eiger who says, that if one misses out *mashiv horuach* on Friday night he doesn't need to repeat *shemonah esrei*. He says, if one davens on Friday night *ma'ain sheva* (a shortened version of the Friday night *shemonah esrei*) instead of the full *shemonah esrei* he is *yoitsa*. Since one can be *yoitsa* with *ma'ain sheva*, in which one makes no mention of rain at all, then surely one who davens the entire *shemonah esrei* and makes no mention of rain shouldn't be worse off, he ends of *tzorich iyun* [the matter needs more looking in to].

Can a *yochid* [individual] be *yoitsa* his *chiyuv tefillah* with *ma'ain sheva*

From the *loshan* of R' Akiva Eiger: – “it's not worse than one who only davens *ma'ain sheva* where he is *yoitsa b'dieved*”, it sounds like a *yochid* can be *yoitsa* his *chiyuv tefillah* on Friday night with *ma'ain sheva*. However, it's not so simple and it's actually a *machlokes haposkim*. The *Magen Avraham* (268) holds, that one can be *yoitsa* his *chiyuv tefillah* with *ma'ain sheva*, however, the *Eliyahu Rabbah* argues and says a *yochid* can't be *yoitsa* his *chiyuv tefillah* with *ma'ain sheva* and a *yochid* can't daven *ma'ain sheva*. If someone comes late to davening, has no *siddur* and doesn't know davening off by heart etc. then he can *b'dieved* listen to the *chazon* saying *ma'ain sheva* and be *yoitsa* his *chiyuv tefillah*, however, a *yochid* can't just daven *ma'ain sheva* and be *yoitsa* his *chiyuv tefillah*. R' Akiva Eiger's *chiddush* seems therefore, to be treading on a *machlokes haposkim*.

How can you compare *shemonah esrei* with *ma'ain sheva*?

The *Shevet HaLevi* (10:19) asks the obvious question, there is a big difference between *shemonah esrei* and *ma'ain sheva*. When one davens *shemonah esrei*, the *Anshei Kenesses HaGadolah* fixed that one needs to mention *mashiv horuach*, and if one doesn't, he hasn't davened a complete *shemonah esrei*. By *ma'ain sheva* however, the *Anshei Kenesses HaGadolah* never fixed that one should say *mashiv horuach*, therefore, if one doesn't mention it nothing is lacking and one has a complete *tefillah* even without it.

During the *Aseres Yemai Teshuvah* one is supposed to say “*hamelech hakodosh*” and “*hamelech hamishpot*” in *shemonah esrei*. If one forgot and he finished off the *berachah* like the rest of the year and said “*melech oihaiv tzedokah umishpot*” instead of “*hamelech hamishpot*” he is *yoitsa*, as in the end of the day he mentioned “*melech*”. If however, in the *Aseres Yemai Teshuvah* instead of ending off, “*hamelech hakodosh*” one ended off “*hokeil hakodosh*”, he isn't *yoitsa shemonah esrei* and he has to start again as he never mentioned “*hamelech*”.

There is a *tefillah* known as “*havineinu*”, which is an abridged version of *shemonah esrei*, that one is allowed to say in certain pressing circumstances. There are however two times when one isn't allowed to say it, 1) on *motzei Shabbos*, as there is no mention of “*atoh chonantonu*” in it, 2) In the *yemos hagashomim* – the rainy season, as there is no mention of “*v'sein tal u'motar*” in it. All other times of the year, even during the *Aseres Yemai Teshuvah* one is allowed to say it. The question is, how can one be *yoitsa* his *chiyuv tefillah*

in the Aseres Yemai Teshuvah, by saying “*havineinu*”, in “*havineinu*” we make no mention of “*hamelech hakodosh*”? The answer must be, that “*havineinu*” simply doesn’t contain the *nussach* of “*hamelech hakodosh*” and therefore, it doesn’t matter if one doesn’t mention it.

According to R’ Akiva Eiger, it should come out, that during the Aseres Yemai Teshuvah if one davens *shemonah esrei* and misses out “*hamelech hakodosh*” he is *yoitsa*, as we should say it’s not any worse off than “*havineinu*”, and if one is *yoitsa* “*havineinu*” without “*hamelech hakodosh*” one should also be *yoitsa shemonah esrei* without “*hamelech hakodosh*”?

Therefore, it seems that the entire premise of R’ Akiva Eiger is incorrect, and there are *berachos* known as *ma’eins*, such as *ma’ain sholash* (*al hamichya*) and *ma’ain sheva*, which are abridged versions of bentching and *davening* which are not the same as the full bentching and *davening* and it may very well be that something may be *me’akev* [integral] in *shemonah esrei* and not in the *ma’ain*. Therefore, R’ Akiva Eiger can’t bring *rayas* from the *ma’ain* to the actual *shemonah esrei*/bentching.

R’ Elyashiv explains *pshat* in R’ Akiva Eiger

R’ Elyashiv explains what R’ Akiva Eiger means, he says R’ Akiva Eiger doesn’t mean that if one davens *shemonah esrei* without saying *mashiv horuach*, it’s equivalent to *davening ma’ain sheva* and since *ma’ain sheva* doesn’t require *mashiv horuach* one is *yoitsa*. What R’ Akiva Eiger means is, we see that for some reason on Friday night *Chazal* never required *mashiv horuach*, because if they did, they would have included it in *ma’ain sheva*. Since *Chazal* never changed the *nussach* of *ma’ain sheva* in the rainy season we see that on Friday night *Chazal* weren’t so worried about one mentioning *mashiv horuach*. Therefore, true it’s an integral part of *shemonah esrei*, but we see that on Friday night *Chazal* weren’t so worried about mentioning it, therefore, if one misses it out, perhaps he doesn’t to daven again.

Based on this understanding R’ Akiva Eiger isn’t treading on a *machlokes haposkim* either. R’ Akiva Eiger wasn’t suggesting that if one davens *shemonah esrei* without *mashiv horuach* we can look it as if he is saying *ma’ain sheva* and therefore he doesn’t need to daven again. R’ Akiva Eiger agrees that a *yochid* can’t say *ma’ain sheva*, all he is saying is, we see from *ma’ain sheva* that *mashiv horuach* on Friday night isn’t so important.

The above would seem a straight forwards way to understand R’ Akiva Eiger, we have to understand why the *Shevet HaLevi* didn’t understand it like this.

What exactly is the nature of a *berachah* which is a *ma’ain*?

There is a *chakirah* when it comes to *berachos* which are a *ma’ain*, as to what exactly the nature of such *berachos* are. When one says *ma’ain sheva/ma’ain sholash*, is *pshat* that he is saying a synopsis of *shemonah esrei*/bentching - saying the main parts of *shemonah esrei*/bentching however, he isn’t saying the entire thing, or is *pshat* that a *ma’ain* is *roshei tevas* for the entire *shemonah esrei*/bentching, just like *ר"ר* is *roshei teves* for *ראש חודש*, and *רבש"ע* is *roshei teves* for *של עולם* similarly a *ma’ain* is a sort of *roshei teves* for the entire *shemonah esrei*/bentching (obviously a *ma’ain* isn’t literally *roshei teves*, but what we mean is, that the entire bentching/*shemonah esrei* is hinted at in the *ma’ain*).

There is a *machlokes Rishonim* if *ma’ain sholash* (*al hamichya*) is *de’O’raisa* or *derabonon*. The *Rashba* in *Berachos* (35a) learns that’s it’s *de’O’raisa* and the *Rambam* learns it’s *derabonon*. The practical difference is, if one is unsure if he said it or not if he needs to go back. By *birchas hamazon* which is *de’O’raisa*, if one is unsure if he bentched or not, he needs to bentch again. By *ma’ain sholash* according to the *Rashba* that learns it’s *de’O’raisa* if one is unsure if he said it or not, he has to say it again, according to the *Rambam* who learns it’s *derabonon*, he doesn’t need to say it again.

Is a woman *mechuyav* in *birchas hamazon mid’O’raisa*? The *Gemara* in *Berachos* (20b) is in doubt about this, at the stage in the *Gemara* where the *Gemara* says perhaps a woman isn’t *mechuyav mid’O’raisa*, there is a *machlokes Rishonim* as to why not. *Rashi* learns, the reason perhaps they aren’t *mechuyav mid’O’raisa* is because in bentching we mention *על הארץ הטובה אשר נתן לך*, we talk about the wonderful land of Eretz Yisrael that Hashem gave us, and women didn’t receive a portion in Eretz Yisrael therefore, perhaps bentching for them isn’t *de’O’raisa*. *Tosfos* argues on *Rashi* and says, if that’s the case, then *Kohanim* and *Leviyim* also shouldn’t have a *chiyuv mid’O’raisa* to bentch as they also didn’t receive a portion of land in Eretz Yisrael, therefore, *Tosfos* learns a different *pshat* and says in bentching we mention about *bris* and *Torah* (*על בריתך שחתמת בבשרנו ועל תורתך שלמדתנו*), and women have no *chiyuv* to learn *Torah*, therefore, perhaps they have no *chiyuv mid’O’raisa* to bentch.

In *ma’ain sholash* we make no mention of *bris* and *Torah*, as *ma’ain sholash* is just a synopsis of bentching. According to the *Rashba* who learns that *ma’ain sholash* is *de’O’raisa*, it should come out, since in *ma’ain sholash* we don’t mention *bris* and *Torah* it should be *de’O’raisa* for women, whereas *birchas hamazon* where we mention *bris* and *Torah* should be *derabonon* for women. According to the *Rashba* it should come out, *birchas hamazon* is *derabanan* and *ma’ain sholash* is *de’O’raisa*, which is a very difficult thing to say. From here the *Miday Shabbos* proves, it must be that *ma’ain sholash* isn’t merely a synopsis of bentching, but it must be like *roshei teves* of the entire bentching, and since it’s *roshei teves* of the entire bentching, included somewhere in *ma’ain sholash* must also be *bris* and *Torah*, and since women aren’t *mechuyav* in *bris* and *Torah*, it comes out that for women *ma’ain sholash* is also *derabonon*.

Based on the above we can now understand the *Shevet HaLevi*. The *Shevet HaLevi* perhaps learns like what we just said, that a *ma'ain* of bentching/davening, is *roshei teves* of the entire bentching/davening. Since *ma'ain sheva* is *roshei teves* of *shemonah esrei*, when one says *ma'ain sheva* it's as if he is saying *mashiv horuach*, therefore, we can't say like R' Elyashiv, that R' Akiva Eiger means that since in *ma'ain sheva* one doesn't say *mashiv horuach* we see on Friday night *Chazal* decided it's not so important, because one in fact does say it in *ma'ain sheva*, albeit in *roshei teves* form. Consequently, he doesn't understand the whole R' Akiva Eiger, and how R' Akiva Eiger can say that if one misses out, it shouldn't be any worse than *ma'ain sheva*. When one says *ma'ain sheva* he is saying *mashiv horuach* in *roshei teves* form, however, when he says *shemonah esrei* and misses it out, he hasn't said it at all.

The *Da'as Torah* adds onto R' Akiva Eiger's *chiddush*

R' Akiva Eiger said his *chiddush* about *mashiv horuach* on Friday night, the *Da'as Torah* wants to take this *chiddush* a stage further and apply it to *yaleh veyovoi* on Succos and Friday night Chol HaMoed Pesach (first day Pesach that falls on Friday night, we don't say *ma'ain sheva*). If one forgets to say *yaleh veyovoi* on Pesach and Succos he has to daven *shemonah esrei* again. The *Da'as Torah* says however, if on Friday night Chol HaMoed one forgot to say *yaleh veyovoi* he doesn't need to daven again, if one is *yoitsa ma'ain sheva* without mentioning *yaleh veyovoi*, one who says the entire *shemonah esrei* and misses out *yaleh veyovoi* shouldn't be any worse off.

R' Shlomo Zalman (*Siach Halachah*) however, argues on the above. He says, one can't bring any *rayas* from *ma'ain sheva*, *ma'ain sheva* was primarily fixed for Friday night, not for Yom Tov and Chol HaMoed. If we find that on Shabbos one doesn't need to say *mashiv horuach* in *ma'ain sheva*, perhaps we can say that we see *mashiv horuach* on Friday night isn't so important, however, if one doesn't need to say *yaleh veyovoi* in *ma'ain sheva* we can't bring any *rayas* from there to the main *shemonah esrei*, as the reason they didn't fix *yaleh veyovoi* in it, wasn't because it's not important on Friday night, rather it's because *ma'ain sheva* wasn't made for Yom Tov and Chol HaMoed.

What happens if one forgets to say *mashiv horuach* in a *beis chasanim*

The *din* is, that in a *beis chasanim* (a *chosan's* house) we don't say *ma'ain sheva* on Friday night. What happens if in a *beis chasanim* one misses out *mashiv horuach* on Friday night, can we still apply R' Akiva Eiger's *svora*?

R' Shlomo Zalman (*Siach Halachah*) says that one can, as we see from the fact that the *tefillah* of *ma'ain sheva* doesn't contain *mashiv horuach* in that it must be it's not so important on Friday night. True, this particular *minyanyan* doesn't say *ma'ain sheva*, but plenty others do, and from the fact that the other *minyanim* don't say *mashiv horuach* in *ma'ain sheva* we see that on Friday night it's not so important.

A new *pshat* as to why R' Akiva Eiger never said his *chiddush* by *yaleh veyovoi*

There is a famous R' Chaim that differentiates between the *chiyuv* of saying *vsein tal umotar* and the *chiyuv* of saying *yaleh veyovoi*. The *din* is, if one forgets to say *vsein tal umotar* in *Mincha* on *erev Shabbos*, he has to daven *Maariv* twice on Friday night, even though he won't mention *vsein tal umotar* in the *Shabbos shemonah esrei*, he still has to daven *Maariv* twice.

There is a similar *din* by *yaleh veyovoi*, that if one forgets to say *yaleh veyovoi* in *Mincha* on Rosh Chodesh, he has to daven *Maariv* twice, even though it's no longer Rosh Chodesh and he won't be mentioning *yaleh veyovoi* in his *shemonah esrei*. On this second *din*, *Tosfos* in (*Berachos* 26b) asks, what is the point of davening *Maariv* twice, it's no longer Rosh Chodesh and one won't be mentioning *yaleh veyovoi*?

R' Chaim asks the obvious question, why does *Tosfos* only ask his question about *yaleh veyovoi*, surely *Tosfos* could ask the same question by *vsein tal umotar*, that what is the point of davening *Maariv* twice on Friday night, one still won't be mentioning *vsein tal umotar*?

R' Chaim answers, that the *hazkoras* [special mentionings] of *vsein tal umotar* and *yaleh veyovoi*, are very different. *Vsein tal umotar* is part of the *sefer hatefillah* (מטבעו שטבעו חכמים) that the *Anshei Kneses HaGadolah* fixed, and if one misses it out, it's considered as if he hasn't davened at all. *Yaleh veyovoi* however, is simply a *hazkorah*, one should mention about Rosh Chodesh in davening, if however, one missed it out, it's still considered as if he davened. If one misses it out, he has to daven again in order to make sure to mention the *hazkorah*, however, it's not considered as if he hasn't davened. Therefore, *Tosfos* asks, explains R' Chaim, if one misses out *yaleh veyovoi* it's still considered as though he has already davened, the only reason he needs to daven again is to mention the *hazkorah*, since it's no longer Rosh Chodesh, what is the point of davening again, one still won't make any mention of the *hazkorah*. By *vsein tal umotar* however, *Tosfos* was never bothered as to why he is davening again, because when one misses out *vsein tal umotar* it's as if he hasn't davened, he needs to daven twice in order make up for the lost *tefillah*, that he never davened.

Based on the above, perhaps we can now explain a new *pshat* as to why R' Akiva Eiger doesn't bring a *rayah* from *ma'ain sheva*, that if one misses out *yaleh veyovoi* he doesn't need to daven again. *Mashiv horuach* is presumably similar to *vsein tal umotar* and is considered part of the *sefer hatefillah*, and if one doesn't say it, it's considered as if he hasn't davened. Since on Friday night, we don't mention *Mashiv horuach* in *ma'ain sheva*, it must be that it's not a part of the *sefer hatefillah* on Friday night, consequently if one misses it out, there is no problem. *Yaleh veyovoi* however, isn't a *chelek* of the *sefer hatefillah*, it's merely a *hazkorah*, and if one

misses out, he needs to daven again in order to mention the *hazkorah*, and whether it's part of *ma'ain sheva* or not it doesn't matter, as one still has a *chiyuv* to mention the *hazkorah*.

***Divrei Torah* for the Shabbos Table**

An important lesson we need to learn from the moons mistake

The *pasuk* says: ויעש אלקים את שני המארות הגדלים את המאור הגדל לממשלת היום ואת המאור הקטן לממשלת הלילה ואת הכוכבים - "And Hashem made the two great luminaries, the greater luminary to dominate the day and the lesser luminary to dominate the night; and the stars." (*Bereishis* 1:16) Rashi quotes the Gemara in *Chullin* (60b), which says: "Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi raises a contradiction: First it says, 'Hashem made the two great luminaries' (implying both were great) then it says 'the greater luminary... and the lesser luminary' (implying one was great and one was small)." He resolves the contradiction by explaining that originally both luminaries were the same size until the moon came before Hakadosh Baruch Hu, and said "Master of the Universe, can two kings both wear the same crown?" To which Hashem responded, "Go make yourself smaller." The moon is in fact much smaller than the sun. This came about because the moon argued, "Two kings cannot simultaneously rule with a single crown."

When we hear such a *Chazal*—the moon complained, the moon felt bad, etc. we need to understand what is being taught. The moon is an inanimate object. These are metaphors. What exactly is the Medrash trying to teach us, with the conversation between the moon and the Ribbono shel Olam?

The Tolner Rebbe writes that this story is very indicative of human beings. The moon thought that its claim to fame was its size. "I am as big as the sun." This is my 'thing' — my uniqueness! The truth of the matter is that the moon was wrong from the start. *Rabbeinu Bechaye* and other *meforshim* explain, that the moon was never in the same league as the sun. Even when the moon was as big as the sun, it did not have an independent source of light. Even initially, the light of the moon was merely a reflection of the light of the sun. The moon is dark. We can only see it from earth because it reflects the sun's light.

Rabbeinu Bechaye infers this from the expression יהי מאורות ברקיע השמים – "let there be lights in the firmament of the heaven" (*Bereishis* 1:14). He points out that יהי is singular. If the intention was to speak about two different lights, the Torah should have written יהיו מאורות, in the plural. Thus, says *Rabbeinu Bechaye*, the moon never had its own light, and on the contrary – the bigger it was, the more light it needed to illuminate its surface! The moon was thus way off base in thinking that its greatness stemmed from its size.

To drive home this error, the Ribbono shel Olam, reduced the moon in size: "Go make yourself small." But the reason Klal Yisroel sets their Yomim Tovim by the moon is precisely because it is smaller. The Ribbono shel Olam likes 'small': "...You are the smallest of all the nations." (*Devorim* 7:7) Klal Yisrael resembles the moon, while the nations of the world resemble the sun (in terms of size and magnitude). Because of its smallness, the moon merited to symbolize Klal Yisroel. In fact, all of our Yomim Tovim are based on the lunar calendar.

The moon assumed that its uniqueness and talent lay in its large size. Wrong! Just the opposite! "Your uniqueness and your special strength lie in the fact that you are smaller than the sun, not bigger!"

The Tolner Rebbe says this happens to people all the time. They focus in on one area of themselves. They assume that this will be the area where they excel and show their talents to the world. However, in the end, it turns out that they got it all wrong. Sometimes the very area in which a person assumes he is not so good turns out to be the very area where he indeed excels.

This is the lesson *Chazal* teach with the story of the moon complaining and Hashem commanding it to reduce in size. Self-misperception can cause a person to be totally off regarding self-realization of his talents and how and where he will be able to make his mark in life. This is a very common problem. People are not good judges of themselves. That is why people need to consult outside opinions—Rebbaim, parents and friends—people who can correct and redirect our misperceptions about ourselves and tell us "This is not where you are going to make it!". The moon made this mistake and people make this same mistake all the time.

The Tolner Rebbe quotes the Ibn Ezra. The Tolner Rebbe mentions that the Ibn Ezra was extremely poor, and he had no *mazal*. He once said about himself: "If I would go into the business of making shrouds for the dead, people would stop dying." The Ibn Ezra was also a poet, as many of the Sephardic *Rishonim* were. He wrote poetically (in Hebrew): "I would go to the wealthy man in town (to request funds) and they would tell me 'he left for work already.' I would come back in the evening (to ask him for a donation) they would tell me 'he already went to sleep.' Woe is to me, a destitute person, I was born without any *mazal*."

The Tolner Rebbe commented: Here we are almost a thousand years after the time of the Ibn Ezra. You can open any *Mikraos Gedolos Chumash* and see the Ibn Ezra's commentary. The Ramban quotes him all the time. Who is this "wealthy man" that he spoke about in his poem? That man faded from the map of history. The Ibn Ezra thought he was the unluckiest person in the world. He wrote about himself like he was a *schlemiel* and a *nebech*. He considered the '*gevir*' to be a person with great *mazal*! Not true. Sometimes, only time will tell.

This, the Tolner Rebbe writes, is the same lesson *Chazal* teach about the moon and the sun.

The advantage of human beings over animals

“And Hashem created man in His image, in the image of G-d He created him; male and female He created them.” (*Bereishis* 1:27).

Parshas Bereishis begins by detailing how the universe came into existence. On each day of creation, after relating what Hashem made on that day, the Torah records that He saw what he had created and טוב כי – “it was good”. Paradoxically, although man is considered the ultimate purpose of the entire creation, the Torah does not say that Hashem saw that Adam was טוב כי. Although the Torah uses this expression regarding the creation of the animals earlier on the sixth day of Creation, and it does describe the overall creation as very good after the formation of Adam, nevertheless there is no explicit use of the phrase טוב כי regarding the creation of man.

Rav Meir Wahrsager of Yeshivas Mir in Yerushalayim cites the *Sefer Halkrim* (3:2), who explains that the expression טוב is used to describe something that has fulfilled its full potential and reached its *shlaimus* [perfection]. For this reason, Rashi writes (1:7) that the Torah does not use the expression טוב כי in conjunction with the second day of creation, as the formation of the waters that began on that day was not completed until the third day of creation.

The *Sefer Halkrim* explains that all creations other than man were formed having already maximized their potential, and therefore it is appropriate to describe them as טוב כי. Man, on the other hand, is unique in being fashioned intentionally imperfect, and therefore it would be inappropriate to use the term טוב כי in reference to his creation. What was man lacking at the time of his creation? The *Sefer Halkrim* explains, although other animals grow larger and older, they fundamentally remain the same from the time of their birth until the time of their death. Man, on the other hand, was created with latent potential and unrealized greatness that must be developed. Unlike animals, we are expected to make significant and fundamental changes throughout our lifetimes.

The *Sefer Halkrim* illustrates this distinction based on a *pasuk* in *Koheles* (3:19), in which Shlomo HaMelech discusses the apparent futility of life. He writes הכל הבל מן הבהמה אין כי הכל הבל, which means that humans and animals appear to follow the same life trajectory, being born, living, and eventually dying, in which case there seems to be אין – no advantage to being a person instead of an animal. However, the *Sefer Halkrim* suggests, that the *pasuk* can also be read as saying that there is in fact a difference between them, namely the word אין, which can be interpreted as referring to the dormant and undeveloped potential of man. In other words, the advantage of being a human is that in contrast to animals, we possess אין, the ability to grow and improve.

Rav Wahrsager notes that many people convince themselves that because they were born with certain negative traits, such as struggling not to speak *loshan horah* or get angry, they are justified in deciding that they will always remain that way. However, according to the *Sefer Halkrim*, such people are in essence electing to live their lives as animals. The *Maharal (Tiferes Yisroel 3)* explains that the Hebrew word for animal – בהמה – can be read as a combination of two words: בה מה, what is already in him is what he is.

A person who considers himself a finished product limited and constrained by the character traits and values that he acquired during his formative years is denying his advantage over the animal kingdom by rejecting his אין. Instead, we must change our self-images and view ourselves as incomplete people who are constantly striving to actualize our potentials in pursuit of true *shlaimus*. In order to do so, we must internalize that the very definition of a human being is somebody who is a work in progress. In contrast to a stagnant בהמה, we not only possess the ability to change, but that is what makes us uniquely human, and it is only through constant growth and improvement that we will merit טוב כי. (I saw the above brought down in R' Ozer Alport's, *Parsha Potpourri*)

The special power of speech

“Hashem, Elokim formed man from the dust of the earth. He blew into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living being.” (*Bereishis* 2:7).

A man who was stricken with cancer was presented by his doctor with a painful and heart-wrenching decision to make. In order to treat his illness, the doctor would need to perform surgery, and in order to access the affected region, he would need to cut through either the man's oesophagus or his vocal cords. As a result, the man would permanently lose either the ability to eat, requiring the insertion of a feeding tube, or the ability to speak. From a medical perspective, the two options were equal, so the doctor gave the man the choice of how the surgery should be performed.

Although most people would approach this tragic decision by weighing which of the two faculties is more important to them, this patient was an observant Jew who understood that his decision would have important ramifications for his ability to perform *mitzvos*. If he gave up his ability to eat naturally, he would no longer be able to perform the *mitzvos* of eating *matzah*, eating on the day before Yom Kippur, and eating in the *succah*. On the other hand, if he lost his faculty of speech, he would be unable to say *shema* and *birchas haTorah*.

Unsure of the proper course of action, he approached a well-known Rav for halachic guidance. However, rather than focus on weighing the *mitzvos* to be preserved and lost, the Rav surprised the man by citing the translation of *Onkelos* on our *pasuk*. The Torah records that Hashem formed man from the dust of the ground and blew into him the soul of life, at which point man became a living being. *Onkelos* renders the phrase “and man became a living being” as a reference to the fact that he acquired the ability to speak.

In other words, as advanced as man may be, virtually everything that he can do can also be duplicated by other living creatures. *Onkelos* is teaching us that what makes man uniquely human and elevated above all other species of animals is the ability to speak. In light of this insight into the special status of the power of speech, the Rav advised the man to preserve his vocal cords and forego the ability to eat naturally. Rav Yitzchok Zilberstein adds that even according to the man's initial approach of weighing the *mitzvos* involved, it's clear that the *mitzvos* which required the power of speech are performed much more regularly than those which are associated with the ability to eat and would therefore take precedence.

Man needs to be confronted with limitations

The *pasuk* says: מות תמות מן היום אכלך כי ביום אכלך ממנו מות תמות - "And Hashem Elokim commanded the man saying, 'Of every tree of the garden you may freely eat; but of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Bad, you must not eat thereof; for on the day you eat of it, you shall surely die.'" (*Bereishis* 2:16-17) Hashem places Adam in Gan Eden and makes everything accessible to him – with one exception: The fruit of the "*Eitz Ha'Daas*." The Torah immediately continues: לא טוב היות האדם לבדו אעשה לו עזר - "And Hashem Elokim said, 'It is not good that man be alone; I will make him a helper against him.'" (*Bereishis* 2:18). Immediately after Hashem warns Adam to distance himself from the *Eitz Ha'Daas*, he establishes the institution of marriage as part of Creation.

What is the lesson of this juxtaposition?

We may answer this question by asking another question: If Hashem didn't want Adam to eat from the *Eitz Ha'Daas*, why did He put it in *Gan Eden*? If there needed to be a *Eitz Ha'Daas*, let Hashem plant it somewhere on the other side of the world where it would not tempt man! Had He done that, Adam would have been able to eat whatever he wanted, without any exceptions. What would have been wrong with that?

The answer is that the Hashem is teaching us a lesson. Everyone needs to learn that there are certain things in this world that are off limits. Man needs to confront limitations. Not everything in the world should be accessible. Hashem knew exactly what he was doing. He wanted something to be placed within man's reach that would be "off limits" precisely so that man would recognize that certain things are "off limits."

The *Tiferes Shlomo* makes an interesting point. The *pasuk* cited above reads: ויצו ה' אלקים על האדם לאמר - "And Hashem Elokim commanded upon man saying." The Torah commonly uses a slightly different terminology, for example, וידבר ה' אל משה - "And Hashem spoke to Moshe..." The *Tiferes Shlomo* asks, why doesn't the *pasuk* here also use the expression לאמר האדם אל אלקים - "And Hashem Elokim commanded to man"? The *Tiferes Sholmo* answers that האדם על - "upon man" – means this defines humanity. This commandment (regarding limitations) is what makes a *mensch*! Humanity needs to recognize that there are moral borders in this world – up until this point and no further! Man cannot have **everything** he desires. There needs to be something that man cannot have, so that he can learn the concept of restraint.

Sadly, if we take a look at the world around us and look at the people who have everything, whether legal or illegal, moral or immoral, whatever they desire, we will see that they all inevitably, invariably, sink to the depths. It is because they have no limits, and can get away with everything, that they self-destruct – morally and even physically. When you can say whatever you want to whomever you want and can do whatever you want anytime you want, you stop being a human being.

The *sefer Milchamos Yehuda* writes: This is why the *pasuk* introducing marriage comes immediately following the *pasuk* introducing limitations. After "Hashem Elokim commanded upon man..." then "Hashem Elokim stated, 'It is not good for man to be alone...'" For a person to live with another human being, each party needs to know that there are limits. There are some things you can do and there are some things you cannot do. There are lines that you cannot cross. A person who learns that lesson easily and learns it early will have a successful marriage. A person who never learns that and has no borders and has no restraints – not in the way he talks, not in the way he acts, and not in the way he eats – is not going to have a successful marriage.

Only after the concept of limitations was established into the world, could the institution of living with another person and the concept of marriage be successfully implemented for man. (R' Yissocher Frand)

Why Hashem gave Adam and Chava leather garments

The *pasuk* in this week's *sedra* says: ויעש ד' אלקים לאדם ולאשתו כתנות עור וילבשם - "And Hashem Elokim made garments of skins for Adam and his wife and clothed them." (*Bereishis* 3:21)

Although Adam and Chava were originally created unclothed, they were on such a sublime spiritual level that they were not embarrassed by their state (*Bereishis* 2:25). After eating from the forbidden fruit of the *Eitz Ha'Daas*, their eyes were opened, and they realized that they were bare (3:7). After Hashem meted out their punishments and curses for eating from the forbidden fruit, He made garments of leather for Adam and Chava to wear. Why did He specifically make them out of leather?

The Rogatchover Gaon answers, that the *Shulchan Aruch* (*Orach Chaim* 223:3) *paskens* that a person who buys or acquires a valuable new garment must say the *berachah* of *shehechayanu*, to thank Hashem for his precious new possession. As such, Adam and Chava would be obligated to recite this *berachah* upon receiving from Hashem the new garments that He made for them.

However, the halachah is, that this *berachah* must be recited immediately upon acquiring the new item, while the joy that it brings to its receiver is still fresh and at its maximum. As such, Hashem had a dilemma, as at the moment that He gave Adam and Chava their new garments, they would be required to make a *berachah*, yet they were naked, and a naked person is forbidden to say *berachos*. However, the prevalent *minhag* (*Orach Chaim* 223:6) is not to say this *berachah* on garments made from animals. Therefore, Hashem specifically made the clothing out of leather so that the naked Adam and Chava would be exempt from reciting a *berachah* that they would be unable to make.

Wishing you a Good Winter and Good Shabbos

This *gilyon* was compiled by Moshe Harris. Please consult a Rov for any final rulings. For sponsorship, dedications, comments or to receive these pages weekly
Email: limudaymoshe@gmail.com
Call/text: +447724840086 (UK) or 0585242543 (Eretz Yisrael)
Printed copies available: In Manchester - 37 Legh Street, Gateshead - 2 Ashgrove Terrace or Eretz Yisrael - 24 HaMem Gimmel, Knisa Beis, 1 floor up.