



Shabbos Daf Chaf Zayin

The types of Garments obligated in Tzitzis, and More

בשבת דף כ"ז: תני דבי רבי ישמעאל, הואיל ונאמר בגדים בתורה סתם, ופרט לך הכתוב באחד מהן צמר ופשתים, מה להלן צמר ופשתים, אף כל צמר ופשתים. ובדף כ"ז. אמר אבוי, האי תנא דבי רבי ישמעאל מפיק מאידך תדבר"י, דתני דבי רבי ישמעאל, בגד, אין לי אלא בגד צמר ופשתים, מניין לרבות צמר גמלים וכו' תלמוד לומר או בגד.

רב נחמן בר יצחק אמר וכו' סלקא דעתך אמינא כדדבא, דדבא דמי כתיב הכנף מין כנף וכתוב צמר ופשתים יחדיו, הא כיצד, צמר ופשתים פוטרין בין במינן בין שלא במינן, שאר מינן במינן פוטרין, שלא במינן אין פוטרין, סלקא דעתך כדדבא קא משמע לך.

בדף כ"ז: תנא ודאיתם אתו פרט לכסות לילה וכו', ומה דאית לרבות סומא ולהוציא כסות לילה, מדבא אני כסות סומא שישנה בדאייה אצל אחרים, ומוציא אני כסות לילה שאינה בדאייה אצל אחרים.

- ❦ -

The obligation of Tzitzis for a Garment not made of Wool or Linen

The disagreements in the Tanaim and Poskim on this subject

- תוס', רמב"ם, ראב"ד, מהב"ר, רמ"א -

❦ What is clear from our *Gemara* is that there is a dispute between two *Tanaim* from the *Yeshiva* of *Rebbi Yishamael* concerning whether or not the term *begeh* (garment) in the *Torah* refers specifically to those made from wool or linen. One *Tannah* holds we learn a *mah matzinu* from *tzara'as* to teach that the term *begeh* refers specifically to these materials. As such, a garment made from other materials would be *pattur* from *tzitzis*. On the other hand, the other *Tannah* holds that even other materials can be classified as *begeh*. Therefore, to him all garments would be *chayiv* in *tzitzis*. This is the opinion of *Rava* as well who *darshens* the *pasuk* of "*Ha'knaf*" to teach that by any material other than wool or linen, a garment can only be *pattured* from *tzitzis* using something of the same material. What can inadvertently be seen is that to him all *begadim* are in fact *chayiv* in *tzitzis min hatorah*.

This argument is raised in *Menachos*¹ as well where *Rav Nachman* states that a garment made from silk is *pattur* from *tzitzis*. There, *Rava* challenges his opinion with a *b'raisa* asserting that silk, *kelech*, and *sarikin* are all *chayiv* in *tzitzis*. In response, *Rav Nachman* retorts that this is merely *m'drabbanan*. The *Gemara* there explains that *Rav Nachman* holds of the *Tannah Dvei Rebbi Yishmael* who asserted that since the *Torah* usually uses the term *begeh* and on one occasion specified this refers to wool or linen, therefore all instances refer to these as well. Now, as we have mentioned it is clear from the *Gemara* that even if we say *min hatorah* only wool and linen are included in the *mitzvah* of *tzitzis*, nevertheless all garments are still *chayiv m'drabbanan*.

L'halacha there is even a disagreement in the *Rishonim* as well. *Tosafos* here² writes that although *Rav Nachman* in *Menachos* states how silk only is *chayiv* in *tzitzis m'drabbanan*, nevertheless the *halacha* follows *Rava* who holds all materials are *chayiv min hatorah*. The reasoning is that *Rava* came later. Similarly, *Tosafos* in *Menachos*³ *b'shem Rabbeinu Tam* and *Rashi* both also assert that the *halacha* follows *Rava* who came later. Moreover, the *Rosh*⁴ writes like this as well, and even takes issue with the *Rif* who fails to *pasken* like *Rava*.

However, the *Rambam*⁵ writes that in order for a garment to be *chayiv* in *tzitzis min hatorah* it needs to have 4 corners or more, and be made from either wool or linen alone. On the other hand, concerning a garment made from other materials such as silk, cotton, camel fur, rabbit fur, goat's hair, or something comparable, there it would only be *chayiv* in *tzitzis m'drabbanan* as a safeguard for the *ikar mitzvah*. He concludes that this is because all *begadim* mentioned in the *Torah* anonymously refer only to those made from wool or linen. The *Rif*⁶ asserts like this as well where he writes the *halacha* follows *Rav Nachman* that other materials are only *chayiv m'drabbanan*.

On the other hand, the *Raived*⁷ takes issue with this *Rambam*, and the *Kessef Mishna*⁸ explains that he disagrees with this that the *Rambam* holds only garments made from wool or linen are *chayiv* in *tzitzis m'doraisa*. He argues and holds *l'halacha* like *Rava* that in fact all garments are *chayiv min hatorah*.

The *Beis Yosef*⁹ brings this *machlokes Rishonim*, and he concludes that since both the *Rif* and *Rambam* hold other garments are only *chayiv m'drabbanan*, therefore the *halacha* follows as such. In the *Shulchan Aruch*¹⁰ as well he also writes that only garments made from

linen or sheep's wool are *chayiv* in *tzitzis min hatorah*. Other garments are only *chayiv m'drabbanan*.

On the other hand, the *Darchei Moshe*¹¹ disagrees with the words of the *Beis Yosef*. He asserts that the *Poskim* hold all garments are *chayiv* in *tzitzis min hatorah*, and this is implied from the *Tur* as well. Additionally, he writes similarly in the *Rema*¹² where he asserts there is a *Yesh Omrim* that all garments are *chayiv* in *tzitzis m'doraisa*, and the *halacha* follows suit.^[1]

- נ -

The Chiyuv Tzitzis concerning a garment made from Nylon threads

A leather garment is pattur from tzitzis / Leather threads / A nylon garment made from one piece / A nylon garment made from threads

- שו"ת אגרות משה, הר צבי, הליכות שלמה -

[נ] Now, it may be true that as a general rule all garments are *chayiv* in *tzitzis* regardless of whether their obligation is *min hatorah* or *m'drabbanan*. However, there are still certain material concerning which we have to determine whether or not they are *chayiv* at all. We will now elaborate.

In *Menachos*¹⁵, *Rava* discusses a garment made mostly of leather but with corners of *beged*, and determines that such a thing is *pattur*. He reasons this is because the *ikar* needs to be called a *beged*. What becomes clear is that a garment made from leather is *pattur* from *tzitzis*, and this *din* is cited in the *Shulchan Aruch*¹⁶.

Additionally, the *Levush*¹⁷ writes that something is only *chayiv* in *tzitzis* if it can be classified as a *beged*. This is because the *pasuk* states¹⁸ "V'asu la'hem tzitzis al canfei bigdeihem". To qualify for this description the garment needs to have been created through weaving, and this prerequisite appropriately excludes leather. As such, a leather garment wouldn't be *chayiv* in *tzitzis* even when it has 4 corners.

The *Igros Moshe*¹⁹ clarifies that although *Rava* is of the opinion that all materials are *chayiv* in *tzitzis m'doraisa*, nevertheless even he would agree leather is *pattur*. This is because his *drasha* from "Ha'knaf" is only meant to include garments created from threads just like wool and linen. This excludes leather which isn't comparable to these two materials.

Not only that, the *Igros Moshe* continues by bringing a scenario where one makes thin strips of threadlike leather and then weaves

On the subject, the *Shulchan Aruch Harav*¹³ points out that because there is an opinion holding only garments made from wool or linen are *chayiv* in *tzitzis min hatorah*, therefore one who wants to fulfill the *mitzvah* optimally should be careful to use a *beged* made only from those materials. He infers this as well from how the *Shulchan Aruch*¹⁴ writes that one should beautify the *mitzvah* through wearing a garment made of wool which is *chayiv min hatorah*.

them together to make a garment. He asserts that even in such a case the garment would have the usual *din* of leather making it *pattur* from *tzitzis*. He proves this using the words of the *Rash*²⁰ where he writes that if one make something through weaving thin strips of leather, nevertheless it is not *mekabel tum'ah*. The *Re'av* there writes like this as well, and the reasoning is that although the strips allow for the possibility of weaving, nevertheless leather still isn't considered to be something woven. Because leather can be made into a garment without the weaving process, therefore it can't be given this classification even when made in a way necessitating its being woven. As such, the same can be applied to say it shouldn't qualify for the *din* of a *beged chayiv* in *tzitzis*.

On the subject, the *Poskim* work to determine whether or not nylon (or polyester) garments are *chayiv* in *tzitzis*. The root *safek* has to do with the fact that nylon threads are unlike wool, linen, *kanbus*, or comparable materials which all have natural threads woven together to form garments. On the contrary, nylon is created through a chemical process, and can be formed according to the will of the craftsman. As such, it is sometimes created in the form of big pieces and at other times threads. It is only when made in the shape of threads that nylon is woven using a similar process to wool. As such, this creates a tumult in the *Poskim* concerning whether or not nylon garments should have a *chiyuv tzitzis*.

Indeed, the *Har Tzvi*²¹ deals with this this question. He raises that because the *Poskim* write how all *begadim* are *chayiv* in *tzitzis*, this implies there is no type of garment which is *pattur*. He continues that in truth *Rava* in *Menachos*²² asserts that a garment made from leather with material corners is *pattur* from *tzitzis*, and this is brought *l'halacha* both in the *Tur* and *Shulchan Aruch*²³. Therefore, we need

NOTES

A number of practical differences dependent on whether the chiyuv tzitzis is min hatorah or m'drabbanan

- פרי מגדים, עולת תמיד, מקור חיים -

[1] The *Pri Megadim*³⁵ brings down a number of areas containing practical differences depending on whether the *chiyuv tzitzis* is *d'oraisa* or *d'rabbanan*. We will bring a few of them. [According to how they appear in the *Pri Megadim Ha'mevuar*.]

One of them concerns how it is proper for a person to wear a *beged* which is obligated *min hatorah* so that the user fulfills the *mitzvas asei m'doraisa*. Within this *din*, it comes out according to the *Mechaber* that one must wear a garment made either from wool or linen. To him other materials are *chayiv* only *m'drabbanan*. On the other hand, according to the *Rema* this isn't necessary. He holds other materials are included in the *mitzvah min hatorah* as well. However, the *Pri Megadim* does point out one can infer from the *Rema's* words³⁶ that even he holds *l'chatchila* one should wear a garment made from wool, and not from some other material. His intention is that even the *Rema* would

admit it is best for one to wear something *mechuyev min hatorah* according to all opinions.

Another case deals with a situation where one has a garment subject to a *safek* concerning whether or not it is actually *chayiv* in *tzitzis*. By other materials the *Mechaber* would hold one can be lenient to wear it even without attaching *tzitzis*. Concerning *d'rabbanan's* one can rely on the usual rule to act leniently in place of a doubt. On the other hand, the *Rema* holds other materials are *mechuyev min hatorah* as well. Therefore, to him one would be required attach *tzitzis* before use. However, the *Pri Megadim* points out that although it may be true the *Mechaber* would hold to be lenient is such a situation, nevertheless the *din* is not to create a *safek d'rabbanan* where it is unnecessary. Therefore, even he would agree *l'chatchila* one shouldn't wear such a garment. As such, there only be a practical difference here in a situation where one only has this *beged*.

A third situation deals with a discussion in the *Shulchan Aruch*³⁷ concerning one sitting in *shul* who suddenly realizes that his *talis* is *passul*. The question is whether

to clarify that the *Poskim's din* refers to where the garments are actually woven. As such, this excludes leather because it lacks this prerequisite. The general rule for *tzitzis* is that something unwoven is not *chayiv*, and this can clearly be seen from how the *Shulchan Aruch Harav*²⁴ asserts that leather garments are *pattur* from *tzitzis* because the *pasuk* states “*Al kanfei bigdeiheim*”, and only something woven can be called a *begeid*.

This then brings us to a garment made from nylon. On the one hand, if it is made using one large piece thereby forgoing the weaving process, such a thing would most definitely be *pattur*. Something unwoven lacks a necessary prerequisite to be *chayiv* in *tzitzis*. On the other hand, where the garment is made through weaving threads together, in such a case it would most certainly qualify to be called a *begeid*, and as such would be *chayiv* in *tzitzis*. The *Halichos Shlomo*²⁵ writes like this as well that where a nylon garment is made from woven threads, in such a case it classifies as a *begeid* and is *chayiv* in *tzitzis*. He even goes so far to say one would make a *bracha* over it.

On the other hand, the *Igros Moshe*²⁶ raises how we know that even where one weaves strips of leather together, this is still insufficient for the garment to be classified as a *begeid*. As we have mentioned, this can clearly be seen from both the *Rash* and *Re'av*²⁷. Using this, he asserts that the same should be true for nylon as it also doesn't need to be made into threads which are then woven together. It is possible to create a nylon garment without this process. Therefore, even when following the same process as typical *begadim*,

this still shouldn't be sufficient to give it the *chashivus* of something woven. It cannot be included from “*Ha'knaf*” just like how leather isn't. As such, it should be *pattur* from *tzitzis* even when woven, and would surely be exempt when not. Not only that, but according to the *Rambam* and *Shulchan Aruch* who hold that other materials are only *chayiv m'drabbanan*, to them only materials truly comparable to wool and linen (through being spun and woven) would be included in this obligation.

He continues that in truth there is room to differentiate between nylon and leather made from strips woven together. We can point out that by leather its initial form is a complete piece fully ready to be formed into a garment. It is only through taking it apart that one can then make strips and weave them together. As such, one might think this is why it isn't classified as something woven. On the other hand, when nylon is initially created as threads, there the process is completely necessary. This would give way to say it should classify as something woven. It isn't comparable to leather which isn't thread in its initial form. However, he concludes that nevertheless this shouldn't make a difference. At the end of the day nylon still lacks comparison to wool and linen. In order to be *pattur* from *tzitzis* something doesn't actually need to be comparable to leather which is also exempt. On the contrary, it needs to have similar properties to *begeid* in order to be *chayiv*. The whole reason leather isn't *chayiv* is because of its lack of similarity. Therefore, we can say nylon isn't fully comparable to wool either, and as such wouldn't be *chayiv*.

- ; -

Wearing Tzitzis at Night

An incredible chiddush that if a candle is lit at night one is then chayiv in tzitzis / If court can be held by candlelight at night / A Seudas Purim by candlelight at night / Tzitzis at day in a dark house / Tzitzis at night in the future when moon's light will be comparable to that of the sun

- ספר הפרדס לרש"י, סמ"ע, ב"י בשם י"מ, הר צבי -

[א] From the continuation of our *Gemara* it becomes clear that from the *pasuk* of “*U're'isem oso*” we learn a nighttime garment is *pattur* in *tzitzis*. On the other hand, a blind man's garment is *chayiv*, and this is because his garment is included through the *pasuk* of “*Asher ti'chaseh bah*”. Although it writes “*U're'isem oso*” and this functions to show that *tzitzis* must be seen, nevertheless the blind man's garments aren't excluded because they can still be seen by other people.

Within this subject, a tremendous *chiddush* is raised in the *Sefer Hapardeis*²⁸. It writes there that with candlelight present, one must

still wear *tzitzis* even at night. Practically speaking if one has light they are then *chayiv* to wear *tzitzis* even at night, and it is necessary to make the *bracha* as well. The words of the *Sefer Hapardeis* are brought in the *Gilyonei Hashas*²⁹, but aren't actually mentioned at all by the *Shulchan Aruch* or other *Poskim*.

The *Har Tzvi*³⁰ asserts that these words of the *Sefer Hapardeis* are quite reasonable. The whole *pattur* of *tzitzis* at night is learnt out only from the *pasuk* of “*U're'isem oso*”, and there is no explicit mention there of it having to do with the nighttime itself. The determining factor is sight. As such, there would be reason to believe one should be *chayiv* even at night through the use of candlelight. Not only that, the *Gemara* even asks that we should say one is *chayiv* in *tzitzis* at night, and then use “*U're'isem oso*” to exclude someone blind. The *Gemara's* answer is that it makes more sense to exclude the nighttime where even others are incapable of seeing the *tzitzis*. From there it is clear seeing is the determining factor, and as such

NOTES

or not he must immediately remove it to avoid wearing a 4 cornered garment without *tzitzis*, and the reasoning to say he should is out of *kavod ha'brios*. Therefore, this is only a question within a *begeid mechuyev min hatorah*. On the other hand, if it only *mechuyev m'drabbanan*, then in such a case there would most definitely be no need to remove it as *kavod ha'brios* is capable of even actively pushing off an *issur d'rabbanan*.

Additionally, the *Olas Tamid*³⁸ raises another practical difference. He brings a case where one has strings concerning which he is unsure if they were made by a *Yid* or a *Goi*. For a *begeid mechuyev min hatorah* these strings would be *passul* as we say to act stringently when dealing with *d'oraisa's*. On the other hand, it would be *muttar* to

attach them to a garment obligated only *m'drabbanan*. This is brought in the *Mishna Berurah*³⁹ as well.

On the subject, the *Mekor Chaim*⁴⁰ raises an incredible *chiddush*. He discusses a case where one puts on two *begadim*, one made from wool and the other from a different material. He writes that if we say the *chayiv* by other materials is only *m'drabbanan* then it would be absolutely necessary to make the *bracha* on the wool garment being that only it is *mechuyev m'doraisa*. A *bracha* made on the other garment wouldn't be capable of *patturing* the woolen one. Such a thing is an incredible *chiddush*. [On the other hand, the *Pri Megadim*⁴¹ writes such a garment is capable of *patturing* a woolen one as long as the person has it in mind.]

Rashi was quite spot on in saying one should still be *chayiv* during the night if he has light. Since the *pettur* doesn't have to do with the actual *zman* and rather the lack of visibility, as such with a candle one can still see.

Indeed, the *Har Tzvi* there brings a number of *Poskim* who mention the *din* of lighting candles at night in reference to other matters dependent on day and night. In his initial words he brings the *Smah*³¹ where he discusses holding court at night. The *Smah* writes that although the usual *din* is not to hold court at night, nevertheless through the use of candles (bright enough for people to recognize each other) it would be *muttar*. However, in his conclusion he writes that although this would appear to be the *halacha*, nevertheless practically speaking we can't force the court to convene then, and this is because such a differentiation cannot be found in any of the *Poskim*.

The *Har Tzvi* then brings the words of the *Gedolei Poskim* who strongly disagree with this *Smah*. They assert that the whole reason we don't hold court at night is because the *pasuk* teaches it needs to be held specifically by day. Therefore, lighting candle shouldn't help for this. Candles don't have the power to turn night into day. He continues that this isn't even comparable to what the *Sefer Hapardeis* wrote concerning *tzitzis*. By *tzitzis* the determining factor was sight and not the *zman* of night itself.

Additionally, the *Har Tzvi* also brings the words of the *Beis Yosef*³² concerning what is said in *Megillah*³³ that one doesn't fulfill their obligation when eating the *Purim Seudah* at night. The *Beis Yosef* writes there are those who explain this is only an issue when the area isn't lit up in the usual way of *simcha* and *Yom Tov*. The implication is that with light it would be *muttar* to have the *seudah*

even at night. Now, he queries that this requires thought. The whole reason one isn't supposed to eat their *Purim Seduah* at night is because the *Megillas Esther* specifically makes reference to the day through writing "*Yemei mishteh*". As such, a candle shouldn't be capable of turning the night into day. He continues that the *Pri Chadash*³⁴ explains these words of the *Yesh Meforshim* to be saying it is even forbidden to eat the *Purim Seudah* in a way similar to night though being in a dark house. However, to eat at night even with candles would most definitely not be a fulfillment of the *mitzvah*.

Now, the *Rav Ha'shoel* there raises a *safek* concerning whether one would be *chayiv* in *tzitzis* during the day if in a dark house, or *pattur* because they can't be seen. He then writes that it is reasonable to say one would still be *chayiv*. Although the determining factor is sight, nevertheless it is clear from the *Gemara* that "*U're'isem oso*" could have been used to exclude everything and "*Asher ti'chaseh*" was still used to include a blind man's garment because it can be seen by others. As such, it is clear the *Chachamim* had the power to use these *pesukim* as they saw made sense. Therefore, it is reasonable to say the *pasuk* of "*Asher ti'chaseh bah*" should also include a garment in a dark house being that it can be seen by others from the outside. In fact, this is even a more reasonable thing to say over the garment of a blind man.

In his conclusion, he writes that as we know in the future the light of the moon will be comparable to that of the sun. As such, it is possible there will then even be a *chiyuv tzitzis* at night. He adds that this is the reasoning behind the custom for us to take out our *tzitzis* when reciting *Kiddush Levana*. One of the things we *daven* for in that *tefillah* is for the moon to give off light just like the sun. As such, we would then be *chayiv* in *tzitzis* even at night. [2]

NOTES

If there is a mitzvah to look at one's tzitzis / Understanding the pettur of tzitzis at night

- דברות טשה -

[2] The *Dibros Moshe*⁴² cites the *Beis Yosef*⁴³ b'shem the *Smak*⁴⁴ as saying there is a *mitzvah* for one to look at their *tzitzis*, and it is derived from the *pasuk* of "*U're'isem oso*". He writes that this is implied from *Rashi* in *Menachos* as well where he explains the words of the *Gemara* that one without *tzitzis* in his garment transgresses 5 *asei's*. *Rashi* there⁴⁵ writes that one of them is "*U're'isem oso*". This implies he holds there is a *mitzvah* to see the *tzitzis*, and as such one who fails to wear them does away with this *chiyuv*.

He then raises that the *Sefer Zohar Harakiah*⁴⁶ was bothered with this. It questions there how we can use the *pasuk* of "*U're'isem oso*" to exclude *tzitzis* at night if it is already needed to teach the *mitzvah* for one to look at their *tzitzis*.

To answer, the *Dibros Moshe* asserts that in truth this exclusion concerning *tzitzis* at night isn't learnt out from "*U're'isem oso*" being an extra *pasuk*. On the contrary, it

can be seen from this very *din* for one to look at their *tzitzis*. Once there is a *mitzvah* for one to see their *tzitzis* it may be true that this doesn't withhold the *ikar mitzvah*. However, at the same time we do have a concept called *kol ha'raui l'bilah ein bilah m'akeves bah v'kol she'eino raui l'bilah bilah m'akavto* (When something has the capability for all functions to be performed, failure to fulfill one doesn't withhold the *ikar*. On the other hand, if it is missing the capability to perform a specific function that function then withholds the entire thing.) . Therefore, from this *pasuk* we can exclude *tzitzis* at night being that it isn't possible for one to see them then. As such, the *Zohar Harakiah's* question melts away. Although it may be true the nighttime *pettur* can't be learnt out from the extra *pasuk*, nevertheless it does teach us the *mitzvah* to look at one's *tzitzis*. This then causes for there to be no *mitzvah* at night being that it isn't possible for one to fulfill this aspect then.

He then uses this idea to lengthily explain the opinion within the *Rishonim* concerning this *pettur* of wearing *tzitzis* at night. [Within his words he actually brings up our previously seen concept that using a candle at night could be reason to say one can fulfill this aspect even then. One would be able to see their *tzitzis* through the use of a light. A number of his words are cited in the *Igros Moshe*⁴⁷ as well.]

מראי מקומות

- 1) דף ל"ט: (2) (ד"ה סד"א). (3) שם (ד"ה ורב נחמן). (4) בהלכות ציצית סי' י"ח. (5) בפ"ג מהלכות ציצית הלכה א' ב'. (6) בפרק התכלת. (7) שם. (8) שם. (9) סי' ט'. (10) שם סעיף א'. (11) שם. (12) שם. (13) שם סעיף ד'. (14) שם סעיף ו'. (15) דף מ"ו. (16) סי' י' סעיף ד'. (17) סי' י' סעיף ד'. (18) (במדבר טו, לח). (19) שו"ת או"ח ח"ב סי' א'. (20) פכ"ז מכלים משנה א' (ד"ה משום). (21) שו"ת ח"א סי' ט'. (22) שם. (23) סי' י' סעיף ד'. (24) סי' י' סעיף ד'. (25) להגרש"ז (תפילה) פרק ג' סעיף ט"ז. (26) שם. (27) הנ"ל. (28) לרש"י סי' ל"ו. (29) להגר"ע בסוגיין. (30) שו"ת או"ח ח"א סי' י"ב. (31) בחו"מ סי' ה' סק"ז. (32) באו"ח סי' תרצ"ה בשם א"ח. (33) דף ז'. (34) שם. (35) סי' ט' במ"ז אות ב'. (36) בסעיף ו'. (37) סי' י"ג סעיף ג'. (38) ריש סי' ט'. (39) סק"ג. (40) לבעל חות יאיר. (41) הנ"ל. (42) בסוגיין. (43) סי' כ"ד. (44) סי' כ"ח. (45) דף מ"ד. (ד"ה בציצית). (46) לתשב"ץ. (47) שו"ת או"ח ח"א סי' ג'.